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Should Courts Set Doctors' Fees?

S

Russell J. Glorioso*

doctors' fees? This short query has interesting ramifications. Initially, the question seems to demand
an unqualifiedly negative answer. It is adverse to our system of
free enterprise. It is socialized medicine. It is unconstitutional.
Responses like these can be heard not only from the medical
profession but from the conservative members of the public as
well. Modem legislation, in attempting to regulate an everexpanding population, is constantly moving towards more and
more social control. Rephrase the initial question to read, "should
courts regulate workmen's compensation or Medicare?" What
then, would the same people answer? And, yet, we know that
illness can bring financial disaster as well as other misery.
Are there or should there be laws setting compensation for
doctors? This paper seeks to examine these question by analyzing court decisions and modern trends.
HOULD COURTS SET

Peculiarityof Medical and Surgical Services
The logical starting point in approaching this problem is to
look at the character of a physician's service. Fees are proffered
for a unique service rendered, that of medical or surical treatment, which includes all the correlated aspects of the medical
profession. These services are given special recognition in the
eyes of the law, which raises them to the status of necessaries,
which by law must be provided to a dependent by the parental
head of the household, the father. The implications of this law
are great. Sufficient for the moment is the characterization
Stephen E. DeForest gave to these services when he referred to
them as the "fourth necessity" next to food, shelter, and
clothing.' An Ohio appellate case held that a husband is bound to
pay for medical services rendered to his wife as necessaries, and
the service of an anesthesiologist was held to be in this category.2
This case illustrates that as medical science expands its new
facets continue to be treated as necessaries.
* B.A., Borromeo Seminary College; Fourth-year student at ClevelandMarshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 De Forest, Do Doctors Have the Answer to Lawyers' Economic Problems?,
48 A. B. A. J. 442, 444 (1962) quoting Richard Carter in The Doctor Business, Ch. 1 (1958).
2 Cleveland Anesthesia Group v. Krulak, 135 N. E. 2d 685 (Ohio App. 1956).
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The importance of "a necessary" lies in the fact that if the
one who has the obligation to provide it to another fails to act,
a third person may have the service provided, and the party who
failed to perform his duty remains liable at law for payment to
3
the person who has performed the service.
Physicians' Right To Compensation
Since it is apparent that services rendered by physicians and
surgeons fall into a special class, does it follow that the means
and method of compensation for these services also receive special
treatment? Today more than ever before there is a trend toward
prepayment plans to cover medical and surgical services. Most
of these are in the form of personal medical insurance plans, with
coverages as varied as the medical profession itself. Again, legislation has been provided to protect a person requiring medical
services when injured on his job, by workmen's compensation
acts which vary in scope from state to state. Finally, to provide
for the aged, the Federal Government has recently enacted
Medicare, the value and scope of which remains to be seen.
The right to compensation for services rendered by physicians and surgeons involves a contract, either express or implied,
between the physician and the patient, with all the normal rights
and duties which apply.4 In the absence of an express contract
there is implied by law an agreement to pay for services rendered
by a physician, except that if these services were intended to be
and were accepted as a gift or act of benevolence, they cannot
create a legal obligation to pay at the election of the physician.
When this is the case, the burden of proof is on the person denying liability to show that no debt was in fact intended. 5 At
common law it was held that when one secures the services of
a physician for himself or another, there arises an implied contract to pay for these services. However, there is an exception
to this general rule which favors a neighbor or stranger who
3 Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151, 44 N. W. 295 (1890), distinguished in Cooper
v. McNamara, 92 Iowa 243, 60 N. W. 522, 523 (1894) which states that what
are necessaries in a given case must be determined by the facts in that
case. The Porter case involved a severe attack of a dangerous disease requiring the services of a physician. There was not such an emergency in
this case, the court maintained. See also Lufkin v. Harvey, 131 Minn. 238,
154 N. W. 1097 (1915).
4 41 Am. Jur. 254, Physicians and Surgeons.
5 In re: McKeehan's Estate, 358 Pa. 548, 57 A. 2d 907 (1948).
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secures these services for a stricken person who is unable to
secure the services for himself, but this exception does not apply
to necessaries.'
Standard for Compensation
Since experience reveals that compensation for the same
service rendered by physicians of similar skill and stature varies
widely from state to state and even within the same community,
one may justly inquire as to the standard for setting fees. One
buying medical insurance recognizes that his rates will fluctuate
on the basis of locale and upon the amount of coverage he feels
is necessary for his family and one in his particular station in
life. These prepayment plans are evidently available to provide
for the payment of medical fees, but are primarily available to
allow sufficient reserve for the so-called implied contract to pay.
This implied-contract implies at law a promise by the one receiving the service to pay the reasonable value of the service rendered.7 There has been so much litigation on the question of what
constitutes reasonableness that it will be treated separately below.
For the present, the mere fact that reasonableness is the criterion
for medical fees will be considered. 8 The categorical word "reasonableness" is generally used by courts, and then elements
which constitute this reasonableness are considered in each case.
Ordinary Worth As Element of Reasonableness
There is a tendency to equate the phrase reasonableness with
that of "ordinarily worth in the community," which is held to
mean not the value to the patient treated but the reasonable value
in the community where they are rendered, by the person who
rendered them.9 A 1960 case seems to show the trend toward
this attitude, but it is rather precise in wording so as not to
equate reasonableness with ordinary worth on the professional
6 Cleveland Anesthesia Group v. Krulak, supra note 2.
7 Poulson v. Foster, 67 S. D. 372, 293 N. W. 361, 362 (1940), which refers to
21 R. C. L. p. 415 as authority for this statement.
s Leading cases on the point of compensation based on implied contract as
to the reasonable worth of the services are, Huntley v. Geyer, 43 N. D. 366,
175 N. W. 619 (1919); McGuire v. Hughes, 207 N. Y. 516, 101 N. E. 460 (1913);
and Garrey v. Stadler, 67 Wis. 512, 30 N. W. 787 (1886).
9 Citron v. Fields, 34 Cal. App. 2d 51, 85 P. 2d 534 (1938), which was distinguished in Ventimiglia v. Hodgen, 112 Cal. App. 2d 658, 247 P. 2d 123,
125 (1952) on an evidence question. See also, Ely v. Wilbur, 10 A. 358, 441
(N. J. App. 1887).
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market, when it states that the reasonableness of a physician's
professional charge must be viewed in light of charges usually
made for such services by men of similar professional standing,
and under similar circumstances. 10 This case is often cited today
as giving the most extensive and accurate treatment of the elements which constitute reasonableness and one which makes
"what other doctors are charging" an element to be considered
and not a separate category on a par with and to be given equal
consideration as the category of reasonableness.
The importance of this distinction may be clarified if a brief
hypothetical example is considered. A local branch of the
American Medical Association sets a reasonable suggested fee
for an appendectomy in a range from $200.00 to $500.00. A group
of surgeons from a given locale band together and decide among
themselves that they will handle this type of case within a range
of $750.00 to $1,000.00. A patient protests and refuses to pay
more than $500.00. The surgeon files a suit on the basis of implied
contract to pay the reasonable value of his services, and presents
in evidence that his charge of $850.00 is what other physicians of
similar standing charge for this service in this community. A
court which followed the reasoning that this was a criterion unto
itself would be bound to logically decide in favor of the surgeon.
A court which followed what appears to be the better rule would
state that this is but one element to be considered and that other
factors must affect whether this is a reasonable or unreasonable
charge, and would decide accordingly.
Other Considerations About Compensation
It is therefore evident that the only limitation upon the compensation of physicians and surgeons is the bounds of reason,
and it is the doctor himself who decides what his fee will be in
a given instance in spite of a suggested fee schedule proposed
by the American Medical Association. A physician is not obliged
to rate himself below a class to which, in his opinion, he properly
belongs, merely because of his youth or comparative inexperience. 1 ' It is further the right and duty of each physician to
determine the frequency of his visits and duration of his treat12
ment and to be compensated accordingly.
10 Spencer v. West, 126 So. 2d 423, 97 A. L. R. 2d 1224 (La. App. 1960),
rehear. denied Feb. 2, 1961, cert. denied March 13, 1961.
11 Succession of Percival, 139 La. 938, 72 So. 467 (1916).
12 Ebner v. Mackey, 186 Ill. 297, 57 N. E. 834 (1900).
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Since a doctor performs services he is entitled to recover
for them in the same manner as any other person who performs
services for another.13 When a physician seeks to recover for
14
these services the burden is upon him to prove their value.
Where a dentist showed neither reasonable value of his services
nor an express contract to pay for the services and materials he
used in treating a patient, a judgment in his favor and an order
15
A case decided
denying a motion for a new trial were reversed.
only three years later appears to have extended this rule. There,
a petition seeking to recover the balance of compensation due
was held to be defective because it failed to allege that the charge
made was the reasonable value of the services. 1
It is sometimes overlooked that whenever a malpractice suit
is brought against a member of the medical profession there is a
dearth of expert witnesses, often referred to as "the conspiracy of
silence." But the same experts who were otherwise occupied and
unavailable to testify as to malpractice, flock to present testimony
on behalf of a brother practitioner who has brought a suit to
recover compensation. These men suddenly are inspired as to
what is and is not reasonable, relying on the rule that expert
medical testimony is admissible as to the reasonable value of
medical services. 17 Perhaps this attitude is responsible in part for
courts holding that expert testimony, even though undisputed,
is not conclusive, and that it remains a jury question to determine
the value of the services on the evidence before it.' s The ultimate
weight to be given to the testimony of experts remains for the
jury, whose members are not required to surrender their judgment on the question or to even give controlling influence to the
opinions of scientific witnesses.' 9 What is perhaps the latest rulSpencer v. West, supra note 10.
Poulson v. Foster, supra note 7, here using 9 Ency. Ev. 828 and quoting
from Huntley v. Geyer, supra note 8 at p. 620.
15 Ibid.
16 Miracle v. Barker, 59 Wyo. 92, 136 P. 2d 678, 680 (1943), in the first
instance (note 15), the court implied the allegation of reasonableness by
way of the nature of the action. In this case, the court demanded an express allegation but did eventually consider this petition amended on the
theory that in the case at bar it was the reasonable value of services that
was at issue, so in effect reached the same conclusion by circumloquation.
17 Citron v. Fields, supra note 9.
18 Fowle v. Parsons, 160 Iowa 454, 141 N. W. 1049, Annot. 42 L. R. A. 769
(1899). See also Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 A. 432 (1925).
19 Miracle v. Barker, supra note 16.
13

14
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ing on this question states that it is almost axiomatic that the
question of credibility of testimony is always present, and for
this reason it frequently happens that both courts and juries
discount opinion evidence to a considerable extent, which is
20
their prerogative.
What Constitutes Reasonable Fee
All of these considerations seem to circumvent the real issue
at hand; what constitutes reasonableness? This question has been
reserved until now because it leads to a natural conclusion and
answers the initial query posed. Some common sense observations should be made before turning to case law. Initially, there is
time and place, the when and where the services were rendered.
A service performed in a farm house, during the depression, is
unquestionably different from one performed in a large metropolitan hospital today. Why a service was rendered certainly has
bearing, if only to determine whether this was an emergency
situation. What and how, present such questions as the nature,
intricacy, character, and difficulty of the service as well as the
professional standing, specialty, and reputation of the attending
physician. How much was done by way of time spent, time lost
from other business pursuits, and the actual benefit received by
the patient certainly enter into a determination of reasonableness.
A final element might be who was treated, but this requires an
expanded treatment below.
Several cases have considered these elements, but since
factual situations change from case to case, no one decision
purports to be a glossary of reasonableness. One case not willing
to go so far as to say that customery charges should be considered, merely looked to the admissions and charges made by the
same physician to his other patients. 2 ' A leading case, after an
extensive listing of possibilities, concluded by adding that among
the elements should be included anything which tends to increase
the burden of the services performed by the physician. 22
Louth v. Kaser, 405 P. 2d 276, 280 (Wyo. 1965).
In Re: McKeehan's Estate, supra note 5.
22 Spencer v. West, supra note 10.

20

21
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Consideration of Patient's Ability To Pay
A problem arises with the consideration of who the patient
is, because it implies another question: should the patient's ability
to pay for the services rendered, enter as an element into the
determination of reasonable value of medical services? The
majority rule on this matter maintains that financial ability,
taking in both wealth and poverty, cannot be considered in arriving at the determination of reasonable value of a doctor's services. 23 Some of the minority views hold that the ability of a
patient to pay for services rendered is a real consideration and
should be given weight as an element in the determination of the
24
reasonableness of compensation for physicians and surgeons.
At least one minority case holds that financial ability may be con25
sidered, but not necessarily.
The majority rule is based on the reasoning that if compensation were lowered for the poor it would follow that the rich
man should pay more. These courts continue this reasoning to
state that if a physician treats the indigent he may consider the
inability to recover the value of his services and thereby regulate
the charge. 26 Notice that the majority view was generally based
on cases prior to 1910. It appears that these early cases have been
widely distinguished by later cases and there are many more
Morrissett v. Wood, 123 Ala. 384, 26 So. 307 (1899) as distinguished in
Duggar v. Pitts, 145 Ala. 358, 39 So. 905, 906 (1905), on a procedural matter.
A dissenting opinion was rendered by Judge McClellan regarding ability
to admit certain testimony in Blount v. Blount, 158 Ala. 242, 48 So. 581, 585
(1909); Morrell v. Lawrence, 203 Mo. 363, 101 S. W. 571 (1907), distinguished
in State v. Kramer, 309 S. W. 2d 655, 659 (Mo. App. 1958), which holds that
in the event a child is weak of body or mind, or is in some other way unable to care for himself, even though this child is of age, that is has reached
majority, the parent remains responsible at law for his care and maintenance, which is an obvious exception to the general rule. Further distinguished in Glen v. Thompson, 45 S. W. 2d 948, 951 (Mo. App. 1932), which
states that although one can consider inability to pay to the extent that one
is so indigent that compensation may be lowered, on the basis of that same
reasoning one cannot introduce wealth of the patient to charge more than
the ordinary fee. Also distinguished in St. Vincent's Sanitorium v. Murphy,
209 S. W. 2d 560, 566 (Mo. App. 1948), where this differed from the leading
case, by here submitting the patient's ability to pay to the jury in order to
assist them in determining whether or not the services received were indeed
necessary. Finally a dissenting opinion was rendered by Judge Nipper in
Morfit v. Thompson, 219 Mo. App. 506, 282 S. W. 113, 116 (1926) where the
Judge felt that both parents should be liable for the necessaries of a minor.
(1918); also Young
24 Levitan's Succession, 143 La. 1025, 79 So. 829
Brothers v. Succession of Von Schoeler, 151 La. 73, 91 So. 551, 553 (1922).
25 Spencer v. West, supra note 10.
26 Annot. 97 A. L. R. 2d 1232 (1960).
23
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states following the minority rule today than in 1910, but it
still remains the minority.2 7 Even in those jurisdictions holding
the majority view, that is, opposed to considering the ability to
pay, there exists an exception in favor of consideration of such
proof where it is shown that there is evidence of a recognized
usage or custom in the medical profession in a given area to
consider a patient's ability to pay in order to arrive at a fee for
medical services.2 8 There has also been at least one case completely opposed to the logic that lower fees for the indigent
29
means higher ones for the rich.
Perhaps the most succinct statement on this matter can be
found in a Pennsylvania case which adheres to the minority view.
. . . physicians should not have their services valued, as you

would commodities in trade, by a fixed standard; what would
be a proper charge for the same service to a man fully able
to pay would be excessive to a man of limited means, and
what would be willingly done for the indigent, without
thought of financial reward, should be compensated for by
one who can afford to pay on the scale which doctors of
repute measure as the proper one. 30
Notice that there is no demand that those able to pay the scale
must pay more than the reasonable value of services rendered
to them, but merely that if a physician gets a certain percentage
of paying patients the ratio of the indigent which he treats
should rise proportionately. This plan is one of self-help and can,
if properly adapted, diminish the imminent danger of socialized
medicine.
Where Do Courts Come In
Having examined physicians' and surgeons' compensation
and the elements of reasonableness, one should also consider
abuses of the wide discretion allowed to medical practitioners
in the setting of their own compensation, and also whether or
not the courts should intervene.
It is an essential principle of law that when a matter is
litigated and there is a dispute regarding the material facts that
these facts will be presented to a jury (trier of facts) to decide,
27 Ibid.
28

Ibid., in footnote.

Womack v. Burka, supra note 24.
30 Pfeiffer v. Dyer, 295 Pa. 306, 311, 145 A. 284, 285 (1929).

29
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in most cases. It is also well established that in a trial by jury,
in an action to recover the reasonable value of services rendered
by physicians and surgeons, the question of value is to some
extent in the control of the trial court, which may set aside an
unreasonable verdict.3 1 Expanding this rule, a recent Louisiana
appellate court stated that it is the duty of the courts, in the
absence of an express contract, to determine whether the charges
sued upon are in fact unreasonable, and if so to make a proper
deduction, after weighing all the factors making the services
rendered more onerous than usual, and justifying an increase
over the usual and customary charges made for such services
by men of similar professional standing and under the same
circumstances. 32 A more recent case in the same court goes on
to say that once it has been found that the physician abused his
privilege of fixing his fees, by going beyond the bounds of reasonableness, the court will not hesitate to reduce such charges.3 3
The jurisdiction of a court over these matters is more forcefully brought out in a Maryland decision which holds in part
that where there is evidence of the time, labor, care and skill
given by a surgeon in relation to the illness of a person, as well
as of his standing and skill in the profession, the court sitting
as a trier of facts is itself authorized to appraise the value of
the services rendered, notwithstanding the absence of expert
witnesses.3 4 This case points out that the elements of reasonableness of the fee are all taken into consideration and are not
always adverse to the physician and surgeon. More explicit in
other cases is the fact that, although the opinion of other physicians and surgeons is competent on the question of valuation of
services, it is not so conclusive as to replace the judgment of the
court, whose duty it is to pass on the question of value of services
rendered, which matter is within the sound discretion of the
35

court.

What conclusions can be drawn from the case law regarding
physicians fees? The primary consideration of this paper was
whether courts should set doctors' fees. The answer remains
31 Miracle v. Barker, supra note 16.

Spencer v. West, supra note 10.
Loomis v. Travelers Insurance Company, 169 So. 2d 544, 546 (La. App.
1964).
34 Brown v. Hebb, 167 Md. 535, 175 A. 602 (1934).
35 In Re: McKeehan's Estate, supra note 5.
32
33
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"no," but a qualified no. A legislative enactment setting doctors'
fees would be a plunge into socialized medicine in a country
whose socio-economic structure is based upon free enterprise,
and the result would be that the courts would actually set
general fees. It is evident that each case differs to some degree
as to facts and that therefore each case must be decided on its
peculiar merits. As long as courts are called upon to pass judgment on the question of reasonableness there will be some regulation of doctors' fees. But this is not undesirable. One court has
observed that if the courts do not act, and if medical fees continue
to increase and become an impossible burden, governmental
regulation will be urged as a correction in spite of the general
apprehension of socialized medicine. 3 0
36 Spencer v. West, supra note 10 at 426.
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